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Still a sleepy hollow? Directors’ liability and
the business judgment rule
Jason Harris* and Anil Hargovan†
The statutory business judgment rule was introduced in Australia in 2000
after a lengthy process of consultation and debate. The rule was aimed at
alleviating fears that directors may have that their commercial decisions
made in good faith and for the benefit of the company would be subject to
second guessing by the courts through litigation alleging a breach of the duty
of care and diligence. Since 2000 there have been only a few decisions that
have discussed the rule, giving credence to the prediction that it would be a
sleepy hollow rather than a safe harbour. Fifteen years on, the rule was
recently successfully relied upon for the first time in ASIC v Mariner (2015)
but in circumstances where a breach of duty of care was not proven.
Significantly, the rule remains a hot topic for public debate with the AICD and
Dr Robert Austin proposing amended business judgment rules. This article
reflects on the past 15 years of the statutory business judgment rule and
assesses the case for law reform advanced by the private sector.
I Introduction
The statutory business judgment rule was introduced in s 180(2) of the
Corporations Law (now Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) in 2000 after a lengthy
process of consultation and debate.1 The rule was aimed at alleviating fears
that directors may have that their commercial decisions made in good faith
and for the benefit of the company would be subject to second guessing by the
courts through litigation alleging a breach of the duty of care and diligence.
The introduction of the statutory business judgment rule was a controversial
measure that had given rise to intense debate and scrutiny from academic
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1 See Companies and Securities Law Review Committee, Company Directors and Offıcers:
Indemnification, Relief and Insurance, April 1989; Senate Standing Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs, Company Directors’ Duties — Report on the Social and Fiduciary
Duties and Obligations of Company Directors, Cooney Report, Parliament of Australia,
Canberra, 1989; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional
Affairs, Corporate Practices and the Rights of Shareholders, Parliament of Australia,
Canberra, 1991. For subsequent law reform discussion, see Treasury, Directors’ Duties and
Corporate Governance: Facilitating innovation and protecting investors, Corporate Law
Economic Reform Program, Proposals for Reform Paper No 3, Australian Government,
Canberra, 1997; Treasury, Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law, Roundtable Paper 1,
Australian Government, Canberra, 2007; Treasury, Insolvent Trading: A Safe Harbour for
Reorganisation Attempts Outside of External Administration, Australia Government,
Canberra, 2010.
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commentators,2 legal practitioners3 and business lobby groups.4 Advocates of
the rule pointed to the need to address concerns about directors personal
liability and the dampening effect that this had on entrepreneurial risk taking.
Opponents rallied against the perceived watering down of the requirements of
the duty of care and diligence. Clear lines of argument were drawn with
trenchant positions taken on both sides. Professor Paul Redmond published an
often-cited paper which argued that the statutory business judgment was
unnecessary given the nature of cases on the duty of care and diligence.5
Professor Redmond argued that directors who acted reasonably had nothing to
fear from the (then) current laws and thus the new defence would be
superfluous. The learned professor predicted that the statutory business
judgment rule would languish as a sleepy hollow rather than constitute the
safe harbor promised by its advocates.
As discussed below, this prophetic view reflects the Australian experience.
The statutory business judgment rule, as noted by practitioners,6 has proven to
be of little practical use to directors until the recent decision in Australian
Securities Investments Commission v Mariner Corporation Ltd7 where the
directors satisfied the rule and were entitled to its exculpatory operation. This
decision, together with detailed analysis of the statutory business judgment
rule in Australian Securities Investments Commission v Rich,8 shows potential
for the rule to be more than a sleepy hollow or ‘mere window dressing’.9 The
obiter judgments in Rich and Mariner, however, should not be seen as the
panacea to criticisms of the statutory business judgment rule for reasons
discussed below. Prior to Mariner, new life was injected into issues
concerning the utility of the, albeit imperfect, statutory business judgment
rule. Should the government respond to the current calls of law reform made
by the marketplace, there remains the prospect of significant change on the
horizon due to the separate law reform proposals advanced by the Australian
Institute of Company Directors (AICD)10 and Dr Robert Austin11 to overhaul
the statutory business judgment rule. These competing models, discussed
2 See, eg, R Baxt, ‘Do We Need a Business Judgment Rule for Company Directors?’ (1995)
69 ALJ 571; R Baxt, ‘The Duty of Care of Directors: Does it Depend on the Swing of the
Pendulum?’ in Corporate Governance and Duties of Company Directors, I Ramsay (Ed),
Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, University of Melbourne, 1997.
3 See, eg, Submission by the Law Council of Australia to the Commonwealth Department of
Treasury, 3 April 1997.
4 See, eg, Submission by the Australian Institute of Company Directors to the Commonwealth
Department of Treasury, June 1997, at <http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-
Resource-Centre/Policy-on-director-issues/Policy-Submissions/1997/Duty-of-Care-and-the-
Business-Judgement-Rule> (accessed 17 February 2017).
5 P Redmond, ‘Safe Harbours or Sleepy Hollows: Does Australia Need a Statutory Business
Judgment Rule?’ in Ramsay, above n 2.
6 L Pelling and N McGuire, ‘Court Finds Directors Fulfil the Requirements of the Statutory
Business Judgment Rule’ (2015) 67 Governance Directions 533.
7 (2015) 241 FCR 502; 106 ACSR 343; [2015] FCA 589; BC201505423 (Mariner).
8 (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 (Rich).
9 N Young, ‘Has Directors’ Liability Gone Too Far or Not Far Enough? A Review of the
Standard of Conduct Required of Directors under Sections 180–184 of the Corporations Act’
(2008) 26 CSLJ 216.
10 See Australian Institute of Company Directors, The Honest and Reasonable Director
Defence: A Proposal for Law Reform, August 2014, at <www.companydirectors.com.au>
(accessed 17 February 2017).
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below, are underpinned by fundamentally different philosophical
considerations, with the potential to either emasculate the statutory business
judgment rule or to clarify and strengthen its operation.
This article examines of the nature of the statutory business judgment rule
and addresses the question as to whether it has achieved its stated purpose.
After 15 years since its introduction, we can make a reasonably informed
assessment of the role and utility (if any) of the statutory business judgment
rule. Part II discusses the place of the business judgment rule in the framework
of corporate regulation. Part III examines the judicial consideration of the
statutory business judgment rule since its introduction in 2000, particularly the
important analysis in the One.Tel litigation in Rich12 and the rare success in
Mariner. Part IV provides a critical assessment of the recent independent law
reform proposals put forward by the AICD and Dr Robert Austin. Part V
concludes with an assessment on what future role the statutory business
judgment rule may have in corporate governance in Australia.
II The business judgment rule
A The scope and content of the rule
The statutory business judgment in s 180(2) applies to a director’s and
officer’s breach of duty of care and diligence. This duty arises from four
potential sources. First, under the express or implied terms of a contract.13
Second, the common law imposes a tortious duty of care on directors and
officers.14 Third, a duty of care arises in equity because of the business the
director or officer holds themselves out as being capable of performing. The
duties of care that arises from tort law and the law of equity are both based on
assessing whether the individual defendant acted as a reasonable person would
in the circumstances.15 The nature of the duty is shaped by the role and
responsibilities that the person has within the company’s circumstances.16
Fourth, the law imposes a statutory duty of care and diligence on directors and
officers17 under s 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act). The
statutory duty in s 180(1) is expressed to be one of due care and diligence
without the mention of skill, however the courts have held that a duty to
exercise reasonable skill for the position is implied.18 The duty will hereafter
be referred to as the ‘duty of care’.
11 See B Austin, ‘Boards that Lead Need Better Protection’, Australian Financial Review
(online), 21 March 2013.
12 (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410.
13 Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555; [1957] 1 All ER 125.
14 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607; BC9504558.
15 Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187; 14 ACSR 109;
BC9406797; Australian Securities Commission v Gallagher (1993) 11 WAR 105; 10 ACSR
43; BC9301114; Vines v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 73
NSWLR 451; 62 ACSR 1; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341.
16 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607; BC9504558.
17 The definition of officer in s 9 of the Act includes directors as well as company secretaries
and external administrators (such as liquidators who sell the company’s assets). The
definition of director in s 9 of the Act includes formally appointed directors as well as those
who act in the role without being properly appointed (de facto directors) and those with
significant influence over the board (shadow directors).
18 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607; BC9504558. For a historical
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The duty of care sits within a complex framework of duties and obligations
that are imposed on company directors and officers.19 Directors and officers
are, for example, subject to personal liabilities under a range of circumstances
under the Act including:
• administrative filing obligations;20
• disclosure obligations;21 and
• insolvent trading (directors only).22
Notwithstanding the diverse and complex range of personal liabilities and
duties that are imposed on them, it is instructive to note that the statutory
business judgment rule does not extend protection to such situations.23
However, it should be noted that in 2007 the Commonwealth Treasury raised
the possibility of extending the business judgment rule to cover a broader
range of liabilities, although to date no progress has been made on that and
given the time lapse it would appear that no further action will be taken to
implement such a change.24 The Federal Government also raised the
possibility of extending a business judgment style defence to insolvent trading
in 2010,25 but this was ultimately rejected by the government in 2011 and
recently substituted with a new set of reform proposals in this area. This article
does not address the recent proposed reforms to insolvent trading defences,
which raise separate policy issues.26
The statutory business judgment rule was introduced into the Corporations
Law (now Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) s 180(2) in 1999 as part of the
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) and came into operation
in 2000. The rule provides:
review of the statutory duty of care and diligence, see the judgments of Austin J in
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 322; [2003]
NSWSC 1116; BC200308116 and in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v
Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 341; [2003] NSWSC 85; BC200300433.
19 See further R Austin, H Ford and I Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law and
Corporate Governance, 16th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005.
20 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 188 (where there is no company secretary).
21 Ibid, ss 674(2A) and 729. See further, A Zandstra, J Harris and A Hargovan, ‘Widening the
Net: Accessorial Liability for Continuous Disclosure Contraventions’ (2008) 22 Aust Jnl
Corp Law 51.
22 Ibid, s 588G. See further, J Harris, ‘Director Liability for Insolvent Trading: Is the Cure
Worse than the Disease?’ (2009) 23 Aust Jnl Corp Law 266; A MacFarlane, ‘Safe Harbour
Reforms — Should Insolvent Trading Provisions be Reformed?’ (2010) 18 Insolv LJ 138;
T Howes, ‘Must the Captain Go Down With the Ship? The Avenues Available to Directors
to Protect Themselves from Liability for Insolvent Trading’ (2012) 30 CSLJ 7. For
consideration of recent reform proposals see: J Harris, ‘Reforming Insolvent Trading to
Encourage Restructuring: Safe Harbour or Sleepy Hollows?’ (2016) 27 JBFL&P 294.
23 See Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee, Personal Liability for Corporate Fault,
Australian Government, Canberra, September 2006; B Baxt, ‘Future Directions for
Corporate Law: Where Are We Now and Where Do We Go From Here? The Dilemmas of
the Modern Company Director’ (2011) 25 Aust Jnl Corp Law 213.
24 Treasury, Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law, above n 1. See further M Byrne, ‘Directors
to Hide from a Sea of Liabilities in a New Safe Harbour’ (2008) 22 Aust Jnl Corp Law 255.
25 Treasury, Insolvent trading, above n 1.
26 Australian Government and National Innovation Science Agenda, Improving bankruptcy
and insolvency laws, Proposals Paper, April 2016, at <www.innovation.gov.au> (accessed 17
February 2017). For discussion see A Hargovan, ‘Corporate Governance in Financially
Troubled Companies: Australian Law Reform Proposals (2016) 34 CSLJ 483; Harris, above
n 22.
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Business judgment rule
180(2) A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment
is taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1), and their equivalent duties at
common law and in equity, in respect of the judgment if they:
(a) make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; and
(b) do not have a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment;
and
(c) inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent they
reasonably believe to be appropriate; and
(d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.
The director’s or officer’s belief that the judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation is a rational one unless the belief is one that no reasonable person in their
position would hold.
Note: This subsection only operates in relation to duties under this section and their
equivalent duties at common law or in equity (including the duty of care that arises
under the common law principles governing liability for negligence) – it does not
operate in relation to duties under any other provision of this Act or under any other
laws.
180(3) In this section:
‘business judgment’ means any decision to take or not take action in respect of a
matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation.
The individual elements of this provision are examined in Part III. The rule
was based on the business judgment rule utilised in the United States.27 The
American Law Institute (ALI) recommended a business judgment rule in its
reformulation of corporate governance principles.28 While some states have
adopted this formulation, many important corporate law states (including
Delaware) have continued to rely upon a common law formulation of the
rule.29 While the Australian statutory business judgment rule is based in part
on the US formulation of the rule, there are many significant differences.30 The
most important difference is that the US rule operates as a presumption against
liability that must be overcome by the plaintiff before an action can be taken
against directors for a breach of the duty of care.31 In Australia, the rule
operates as a defence that the defendant directors or officers have the onus of
establishing if the duty of care is contravened.32
The statutory business judgment rule may be contrasted with the so-called
27 For a review of the United States law see S Radin, The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary
Duties of Corporate Directors, 6th ed, Aspen Publishers, 2009; J Macey, Macey on
Corporation Laws, Aspen Publishers, 2002 (looseleaf).
28 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance, 1994. For a summary see
M Legg and D Jordan, ‘The Australian Business Judgment Rule After ASIC v Rich:
Balancing Director Authority and Accountability’ (2013) 34 Adel LR 403.
29 Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A 2d 805.
30 See D DeMott, ‘Legislating Business Judgment — A Comment from the United States’
(1998) 16 CSLJ 575; J Du Plessis, ‘Open Sea or Safe Harbour? American, Australian and
South African Business Judgment Rules’ (2011) 32 Comp L 347.
31 The leading decision in the United States is Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A 2d 805. See also
the detailed policy discussion in Cuker v Mikalauskas (1997) 692 A 2d 1042.
32 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7269]–[7270]. See further
Legg and Jordan, above n 28, at 415–18.
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general law business judgment rule. This is not so much a rule, as rather a
general reluctance by the judiciary to interfere with bona fide commercial
decisions, particularly where there is no conflict of interest or abuse of power.
This was expressed by the High Court of Australia as follows (footnotes
omitted):
Directors in whom are vested the right and the duty of deciding where the
company’s interests lie and how they are to be served may be concerned with a wide
range of practical considerations, and their judgment, if exercised in good faith and
not for irrelevant purposes, is not open to review in the courts. The general law
business judgment rule was developed to give directors greater certainty when
making commercial decisions so as to promote entrepreneurial risk taking, as noted
by a commentator.33 However, another reason for its development may be that the
courts are simply ill-equipped to review genuine matters of commercial judgment.
This is demonstrated in cases involving applications for directions by insolvency
practitioners, who are officers of the companies they manage, where the courts have
steadfastly refused to give directions on matters of genuine commercial judgment.
While the court’s focus may be drawn by decisions tainted with an abuse of power
or improper motive, the commercial merits of decisions are not reviewable by the
courts.34
It has also been argued that the general law business judgment rule is better
conceived of as a doctrine of judicial non-intervention which stands in
contrast to a business judgment rule that provides a safe harbor that
‘immunizes individual directors from liability for damages stemming from
particular decisions’.35 Professor Du Plessis cogently argues that the general
law business judgment rule is more of an academic construct used to explain
the approach taken by the courts than a common law rule. This is consistent
with the explanation given to the general law business judgment rule in the
recent important Rich case (discussed below).
The reluctance of courts to interfere in matters of commercial decision
making where decisions are not tainted by an improper purpose or abuse of
power led many opponents to question why the statutory business judgment
rule was necessary. If directors’ commercial decisions were already protected
by the general law business judgment rule, why was a statutory rule also
necessary? However, the general law business judgment rule has recently been
explained in the Rich case as constituting only a relevant consideration for
assessing whether a breach of the duty of care has occurred rather than as
creating a bright line standard of judicial review.36
33 Young, above n 9, at 219.
34 Harlowe’s Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lake’s Entrance) Oil Co NL (1968) 121 CLR 483
at 493; BC6800800. Similar comments were made by the Privy Council in Howard Smith
Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 at 832. See also, W Bainbridge and T Connor,
‘Another Way Forward? The Scope for an Appellate Court to Reinterpret the Statutory
Business Judgment Rule’ (2016) 34 CSLJ 415 at 419–21.
35 J Farrar, ‘Towards a Statutory Business Judgment Rule in Australia’ (1998) 8 Aust Jnl Corp
Law 237; L Law, ‘The Business Judgment Rule in Australia: A Reappraisal Since the AWA
Case’ (1997) 15 CSLJ 174; Du Plessis, above n 30.
36 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7253].
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B The justification for the statutory rule
The statutory business judgment rule recognises that directors and other
officers are often required to make decisions with incomplete information due
to time constraints and limited information available at the time of the
decision. Problems with a decision-making process may be clear in hindsight
but are difficult to assess at the time of making the decision, particularly in
real-life situations with time pressures and incomplete information. Takeovers
provide a good example of the difficulties associated with complying with the
duty of care in a pressured environment. Takeover situations involve inherent
limitations on the supply of appropriate and accurate information in a timely
manner where a company is required to respond to a takeover by releasing
information that must be compiled and released during a short timeframe.37
Market conditions tend to fluctuate significantly during a takeover period,
which can make forecasting share values and overall enterprise value difficult.
The directors and officers must usually make the best of what information they
are reasonably able to provide during the statutory timeframes. In such cases,
it is difficult to impose a universal objective standard on directors and officers
because each situation, and each company, are different. Continuous
disclosure obligations, which require disclosing entities (such as ASX listed
companies) to disclose material information to the market immediately, are
another example of situations where incomplete information and time pressure
make optimal decision making difficult.
As noted above, the duty of care under both general law and s 180(1) is
molded to shape the circumstances, which should mean that the pressures that
directors and officers are under will be taken into account when determining
whether a breach of duty has occurred. However, directors and officers were
concerned that the courts had failed to provide clear guidance as to what
conduct will or would not satisfy the duty of care.38 The nature of the duty of
care is different to other duties imposed on directors and officers. Unlike
fiduciary duties, such as the obligation to avoid actual or potential conflicts of
interest or the obligation to act in the best interests of the company, it is
difficult to determine ex ante what conduct will satisfy the duty of care.39 This
uncertainty can lead directors and managers to over-comply by adopting
excessive due diligence and maintaining a greater degree of risk aversion than
they would otherwise adopt if the risk of a lawsuit were less.40 The law must
balance the value of entrepreneurial risk-taking with the need for appropriate
standards of corporate governance and stewardship.
The statutory business judgment rule had been recommended for several
years prior to its introduction in 2000.41 Advocates of the rule argue that the
courts had failed to provide a clear and consistent standard for the duty of care
37 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 633 and 635.
38 Farrar, above n 35.
39 K Scott, ‘Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project’
(1983) 35 SLR 927.
40 Explanatory Memorandum, Corporate Law Economic Review Program Bill 1998 (Cth), at
[6.3].
41 Farrar, above n 35; F Carrigan ‘The Role of Capital in Regulating the Duty of Care and
Business Judgment Rule’ (2002) 14 Aust Jnl Corp Law 215; Legg and Jordan, above n 28;
Bainbridge and Connor, above n 34.
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which caused confusion in corporate boardrooms that could hinder efficient
decision making.42 The rule was seen as necessary to provide directors and
officers with some comfort that their bona fide decisions, made on information
reasonably available to them at the time, and which they rationally believed
was in the company’s interests, would not be overturned by a duty of care
action after the fact.43
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Review
Program Bill 1998 (Cth), which introduced the statutory business judgment
rule, explained the need for the rule as giving directors and officers greater
certainty in making business decisions which would ‘remove the uncertainty
for directors and should lead to better management processes within
companies for the taking of decisions’.44 The statutory business judgment rule
was designed to provide ‘a clear presumption in favour of a director’s
judgment’ so that their decisions could not be challenged under the duty of
care, while not changing the substantive duties of directors.45 This was
intended to give directors and officers ‘an explicit safe harbor, being
effectively shielded from liability for any breach of their duty of care and
diligence’.46
The statutory business judgment rule has long had numerous critics.
Opponents argue that the general law business judgment rule already protects
directors and officers from ex post hindsight review.47 Indeed, one of the stated
goals of the statutory rule was to ‘clarify and confirm the common law
position that courts will rarely review bona fide business decisions’.48
Furthermore, critics argue that the terms of the statutory rule are uncertain and
will fail to provide the reassurance regarding business decisions desired by
directors and officers.49 Critics also argue that there were so few court
decisions involving the duty of care against company directors and officers
that the likelihood of having commercial decisions overturned by the court
under the duty of care was extremely low.50 However, it should be noted that
recent trends in public enforcement demonstrate that directors and officers are
becoming subject to much more litigation and liability based on the duty of
care.51 This is illustrated further below under Part III.
Opponents stress that the duty of care should not be watered down by the
42 Farrar, above n 35; A Greenhow ‘The Statutory Business Judgment Rule: Putting the Wind
into Director’s Sails’ (1999) 11 Bond LR 33.
43 Farrar, above n 35; J Bird, ‘Duty of Care and the CLERP Reforms’ (1999) 17 CSLJ 141.
44 Explanatory Memorandum, above n 40, at [2.4].
45 Ibid, at [6.4].
46 Ibid, at [6.9].
47 Redmond, above n 5, p 203.
48 Explanatory Memorandum, above n 40, at [6.4].
49 B Keller ‘Australia’s Proposed Statutory Business Judgment Rule: A Reversal of a Rising
Standard in Corporate Governance?’ (1999) 4 Deakin LR 125; A Clarke ‘The Business
Judgment Rule — Good Corporate Governance or Not?’ (2000) 12 AJCL 85.
50 Redmond, above n 5, p 203. Keller, ibid, at 146.
51 For discussion, see A Herzberg and H Anderson, ‘Stepping Stones — From Corporate Fault
to Directors’ Personal Civil Liability’ (2012) FLR 40 at 181; T Bednall and P Hanrahan,
‘Officers’ Liability for Mandatory Corporate Disclosure: Two Paths, Two Destinations?’
(2013) 31 CSLJ 474.
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statutory business judgment rule defence.52 The importance of robust
corporate governance practices to the Australian economy, as well as to
individual shareholders and indirect shareholders through superannuation,
could be weakened by sending legislative signals that negligence is acceptable
provided the directors and officers thought they were benefiting the company.
Critics of the statutory business judgment rule also challenge the empirical
evidence to support statements that directors and officers are more reluctant to
make decisions because of fears about liability.53 However, it should be noted
that since most of these criticisms were published a number of surveys have
been conducted among directors to gauge their views on liability which
suggest that boards are being more cautious and are finding it harder to attract
the best people to become directors, because of concerns about liability.54
Critics of the statutory business judgment rule counter this point by relegating
the surveys to self-serving statements without independent empirical support.
Lastly, critics have pointed to ss 1317S and 1318 of the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth), which allow the court to grant relief from liability (including
liability in respect of the duty of care) where the conduct was honest and the
person ought fairly to be excused from liability. However, this provision has
been rarely used successfully. In recent years, none of the successful
applications relate to the duty of care.55
III Operation of the statutory business judgment rule
A Initial decisions
In the 15 years since its introduction there have been very few cases that have
applied the statutory business judgment rule to confer on the defendant
directors or officers a defence to what is otherwise a breach of the duty of care.
Indeed, apart from the Rich56 and Mariner57 cases, only a small number of
cases have considered the rule in any detail whatsoever.58 The following
discussion reviews the operation of the rule, with reference to some of the
earlier cases before focusing on the significance of obiter comments in Rich
and Mariner.
52 Keller, above n 49.
53 Redmond, above n 5; Keller, ibid, at 141.
54 Treasury and the Australian Institute of Company Directors, Survey of Company Directors,
2008; Australian Institute of Company Directors, Director Sentiment Index Research,
November 2011; Australian Institute of Company Directors, A Proposal for Law Reform:
The Honest and Reasonable Director Defence, August 2014, at <http://aicd.company
directors.com.au/> (accessed 17 February 2017).
55 Hall v Poolman (2007) 65 ACSR 123; [2007] NSWSC 1330; BC200710202; McLellan v
Carroll (2009) 76 ACSR 67; [2009] FCA 1415; BC200910792. See further, A Hargovan,
‘Director’s Liability for Insolvent Trading, Statutory Forgiveness and Law Reform’ (2010)
18 Insolv LJ 96; P Lewis, ‘Insolvent Trading Defences after Hall v Poolman’ (2010) 28
CSLJ 396; Howes, above n 22.
56 (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410. As will be discussed below, there
was no finding of a breach of duty of care in Rich and hence the (detailed) discussion of the
business judgment rule was obiter.
57 (2015) 241 FCR 502; 106 ACSR 343; [2015] FCA 589.
58 A search of Austlii case law databases and Austlii’s Corporations Act noteup on s 180 and
a search of the LexisNexis Australia unreported decisions on 29 June 2016 reveals no
decision that has considered the elements of s 180(2) after Mariner, ibid.
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Aside from Mariner (discussed below), the only case where the statutory
business judgment rule was successfully applied was in Deangrove Pty Ltd
(recs and mgrs apptd) v Buckby.59 That case concerned the conduct of
bank-appointed receivers in exercising the power of sale whereby the
receivers sold the secured property for less than they were offered by a
competing bidder. The case was argued on several grounds under the
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), including ss 420A (the receiver’s duty of care
during a sale) and 180(1). The court held that s 180(2) applied to protect the
receivers as officers, but this is not a strong precedent on the application of the
statutory business judgment rule, because the court gave no consideration to
the elements of s 180(1) and had already dismissed the reliance on s 420A on
the basis that the conduct was not unreasonable.
There have been a small number of cases that have considered the
application of s 180(2) in some detail, albeit in circumstances where the rule
has been held not to apply. In Re HIH Insurance Ltd (in prov liq); ASIC v
Adler,60 which concerned undocumented company loans provided by a HIH
subsidiary to Adler which Adler then used to buy securities in associated
entities and to purchase shares in HIH. The court found that Adler had
breached his duty of care to the company by causing the company to lend him
and associated entities money in exchange for little or no value. The court then
held that Adler was unable to rely upon the protection of the statutory business
judgment rule because he had participated in transactions where he had a
material personal interest and had not made any good faith business judgment.
Adler deliberately misused his position as a non-executive director to gain
personal advantages, which was not in good faith and for a proper purpose.
The CEO of HIH, Ray Williams, also failed in his attempt to rely upon s
180(2) because he failed to turn his mind to the company’s interests or how
to protect them which was held not to be a business judgment made in good
faith.
In Gold Ribbon (Accountants) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sheers,61 the Queensland
Court of Appeal rejected an argument that s 180(2) could apply where the
director deliberately refrained from participating in board decisions because
he did not want to ‘rock the boat’. Such a dereliction of responsibility could
not be classified as a business judgment.
In Resource Equities Ltd v Carr,62 the court rejected reliance on the
business judgment rule by several directors who had engaged in a transaction
to obtain private benefits and to the detriment of the company. The transaction
involved using the company’s only funds to invest in a speculative technology
company in which the directors had personal interests in circumstances where
accounting advice warned against the transaction and the technology company
was otherwise insolvent and likely to provide no benefit to the company. The
court held that s 180(2) did not apply as the directors did not act in good faith
59 (2006) 56 ACSR 630; [2006] FCA 212; BC200601192.
60 (2002) 41 ACSR 72; [2002] NSWSC 171; BC200200827 (Adler).
61 [2006] QCA 335; BC200606852 (Gold Ribbon).
62 [2009] NSWSC 1385; BC200911514.
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and had personal interests in the transaction.63 Indeed, one of the directors
purported to execute the transaction on behalf of both of the parties as he was
both a director of Resource Equities and an agent for the counterparty (and
was receiving a substantial commission from the transaction).
The James Hardie64 litigation held at first instance that the non-executive
directors had approved a misleading press release which made unequivocal
statements about matters that were intrinsically uncertain (that is, the future
value of asbestos litigation liabilities). The trial judge held that the board had
contravened s 180(1) by approving the press release, which no reasonable
person would have allowed to have been released.65 The statutory business
judgment rule was not relied upon by the non-executive directors because they
argued that they did not approve the release of the document. The company’s
CEO Peter Macdonald sought to rely on the rule but gave no evidence which
meant that the court could not be satisfied that a business judgment had been
made or that the statutory terms of the rule applied. Mr Macdonald did not
appeal this decision.
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals
Group Ltd ,66 the Full Federal Court briefly considered the statutory rule
which, regrettably, was not commented upon in the subsequent High Court
decision.67 That case concerned conduct by the CEO of Fortescue Metals
Group (Forrest) in allowing the company to provide misleading information to
the market and fail to correct it under the company’s continuous disclosure
obligations. This resulted in the company suffering substantial damage to its
reputation and financial penalties imposed by the court. The Australian
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) took action against the
company and against Mr Forrest under the accessorial liability provisions in
ss 674(2A), 1041H and 1041I of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). ASIC also
argued that Mr Forrest had failed to act as a reasonable person would in the
circumstances by allowing the company to contravene the continuous
disclosure and misleading conduct. The court held that Mr Forrest had failed
63 The discussion of the business judgment rule was not challenged on appeal (appeal
dismissed: Carr v Resource Equities Ltd (2010) 275 ALR 366; 80 ACSR 247; [2010]
NSWCA 286; BC201008170).
64 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR
199; 71 ACSR 368; [2009] NSWSC 287; BC200903649 (appeal allowed in part: Morley v
ASIC (2010) 274 ALR 205; 81 ACSR 285; [2010] NSWCA 331; BC201009833); Australian
Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 88 ACSR 246;
[2012] HCA 17; BC201202609 (ASIC v Hellicar); Shafron v Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 465; 88 ACSR 126; [2012] HCA 18;
BC201202608. See further A Herzberg, ‘James Hardie’s Asbestos Liability Legacy in
Australia: Disclosure, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Power of Persuasion’ (2011)
26 Aust Jnl Corp Law 55; A Hargovan, ‘Australian Securities and Investments Commission
v Macdonald (No 11): Corporate Governance Lessons from James Hardie’ (2009) 33 MULR
984.
65 Decision affirmed on appeal by the High Court in ASIC v Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 88
ACSR 246; [2012] HCA 17; BC201202609. For a similar finding in a less high profile case,
see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citrofresh International Ltd (2010)
77 ACSR 69; [2010] FCA 27; BC201000263.
66 (2011) 1 190 FCR 364; 81 ACSR 563; [2011] FCAFC 19; BC201100543.
67 Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486; 91 ACSR
128; [2012] HCA 39; BC201207489.
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to provide any evidence that would satisfy the business judgment rule. More
relevantly, Keane CJ held that a decision concerning whether or not to comply
with a legal requirement (such as whether and how to disclose material
information to the public as required by law) could not be considered a
business judgment because it was not ‘a decision related to the business
operations of the corporation.68 Rather it is a decision related to compliance
with the requirements of the Act’. The Chief Justice went further and stated:
A separate but related answer to Forrest’s attempt to rely upon the business judgment
rule is that s 180(2) cannot be construed as affording a ground of exculpation for a
breach of s 180(1) where the director’s want of diligence results in a contravention
of another provision of the Act and where that other provision contains specific
exculpatory provisions enacted for the benefit of the director.69
In that case, Mr Forrest’s liability under the continuous disclosure provisions
was subject to a due diligence defence which was not satisfied on the
evidence.70 The High Court, however, overturned the Full Federal Court
decision on the basis that ASIC, inter alia, had not proved that the company’s
statements were misleading. Thus, the High Court did not see reason to
consider any aspect of the business judgment rule.
B The Rich case
The most detailed judicial consideration of the statutory business judgment
rule came in the One.Tel litigation (the Rich case).71 In that case, ASIC
commenced proceedings in 2001 against the joint managing directors of
One.Tel (Rich and Keeling), the Chair (Greaves) and the finance director
(Silbermann). ASIC’s action was based on a failure of the defendants to advise
the board that the company was insolvent and should be put into formal
insolvency proceedings. The company had collapsed spectacularly the year
before because its internal billing system was defective which led to severe
cash flow problems and eventual insolvency. While Keeling and Greaves
ultimately accepted liability and entered into enforcement agreements with
ASIC, Rich and Silbermann continued to defend the action. In 2009, the case
against Rich and Silbermann was dismissed for a lack of evidence to support
ASIC’s claim that the officers acted in contravention of s 180(1) by failing to
advise the board that the company was insolvent at particular points in time
and should be placed into external administration.72
Despite this result, in an obiter decision, Austin J focused on the nature of
the duty of care and stressed that the duty of care is not concerned with mere
mistakes. This is important for the present issue because it is relevant to the
discussion of the need for a statutory business judgment rule. The duty of care
68 Ibid, at [197].
69 Ibid, at [199]. Compare the approach adopted by Beach J in Mariner (2015) 241 FCR 502;
106 ACSR 343; [2015] FCA 589; BC201505423.
70 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 674(2B).
71 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410. Austin J in Rich gave a
detailed examination of the duty of care and the business judgment rule in ch 23 of his
Honour’s judgment, which runs for 55 pages. The first 33 pages were concerned with the
operation of the duty of care.
72 ASIC’s expert financial and accounting evidence was largely ruled inadmissible by the court
which fundamentally undermined its case.
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is not concerned with decisions that lead to poor results, but rather with
defective decision making processes that do not properly balance the potential
risks and benefits that the choice presents the company with.73 The role of the
statutory business judgment rule then is to provide ‘a defence in a case where
the impugned conduct goes beyond a mere error of judgment, and would
contravene the statutory standard but for the defence’.74 His Honour held that
the statutory business judgment rule may apply where there is a finding of a
failure to act with due care and diligence even after considerations relevant
under the general law business judgment rule have been taken into account by
the court (that is, the conduct complained of is more than merely a mistake).75
The scope of the concept of a ‘business judgment’ had been the subject of
several previous cases, discussed earlier, where the applicability of the
statutory business judgment rule was rejected.76 Austin J held that a ‘business
judgment’ includes steps involved in making business decisions such as
matters of planning, budgeting and forecasting.77 A decision not to take action
may still be a business decision, even where it leads to substantial losses.78 His
Honour agreed with submissions by the defendants that the concept of a
business judgment is to be interpreted broadly.79 Justice Austin agreed with
the determinations in the Adler and Gold Ribbon cases (see above) that a
business judgment must involve an actual decision rather than a general
neglect of duties.80 Thus, the business judgment rule is not available as a
defence against a failure to monitor the company’s financial performance.81 As
Austin J noted:
Monitoring the company’s affairs and maintaining familiarity with its financial
position are not in themselves matters that involve a ‘decision to take or not to take
action’ in respect of a matter relevant to the company’s business operations.82
The most significant aspects of the Rich decision for our understanding of the
statutory business judgment rule are those that explain the operation and scope
of s 180(2)(c) and (d), which had not previously been subject to extensive
judicial consideration.83
Subsection 180(2)(c) provides that the director or officer must have been
73 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7193], [7238]. See also
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373; [2006]
NSWSC 1052; BC200608176 at [102] (Maxwell).
74 Rich, ibid, at [7242]. For a detailed doctrinal critique against this finding see Bainbridge and
Connor, above n 34.
75 Rich, ibid, at [7253]–[7255].
76 Adler (2002) 41 ACSR 72; [2002] NSWSC 171; BC200200827; Gold Ribbon [2006] QCA
335; BC200606852.
77 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7274].
78 Ibid, at [7281].
79 Ibid, at [7276].
80 Ibid, at [7277]–[7278]. For and application of this, see Great Southern Finance Pty Ltd (in
liq) v Rhodes (2014) 103 ACSR 137; [2014] WASC 431; BC201409727.
81 The statutory business judgment rule was not discussed in the important recent decision on
this issue: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291;
83 ACSR 484; [2011] FCA 717; BC201104526 (the Centro case).
82 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7278].
83 Compare Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(2)(a) and (b), which use phrases well-known to
company lawyers as they appear in other provisions, namely ss 181 (good faith and proper
purpose) and 191 (material personal interests).
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informed about the subject matter of the judgment ‘to the extent they
reasonably believe to be appropriate’. ASIC argued that this imposed an
objective standard of reasonableness akin to the duty itself in s 180(1). Such
a view would render the statutory business judgment rule with little scope as
recourse to it could only be made if the conduct was ‘reasonable’which would
not breach s 180(1). Justice Austin held that the reasonableness of the level of
information relied upon by the defendant director or officer is to be assessed
according to:
• the importance of the business judgment to be made;
• the time available for obtaining information;
• the costs related to obtaining information;
• the director or officer’s confidence in those exploring the matter;
• the state of the company’s business at that time and the nature of
competing demands on the board’s attention; and
• whether or not material information is reasonably available to the
director.84
Furthermore, his Honour clarified that the requirement of reasonableness in s
180(2)(c) is not objectively assessed so as to include information that a
reasonable person would have taken into account which means that:
protection may be available even if the director was not aware of available
information material to the decision, if he reasonably believed he had taken
appropriate steps on the decision-making occasion to inform himself about the
subject matter.85
Subsection 180(2)(d), which requires that the director or officer to rationally
believe that the decision is in the interests of the company. The law has long
required directors and officers to exercise their powers in the interests of the
company.86 Prior to this case it had been an open question as to the scope of
the rational requirement, specifically whether this was similar to or lesser than
the standard of objective reasonableness in s 180(1). His Honour held that the
rational requirement is not the same as a reasonableness requirement as the
latter would import the objective standard that exists in s 180(1) into the
defence.87 His Honour explained the scope of s 180(2)(d) as follows:
subparagraph (d) is satisfied if the evidence shows that the defendant believed that
his or her judgment was in the best interests of the corporation, and that belief was
supported by a reasoning process sufficient to warrant describing it as a rational
belief, as defined, whether or not the reasoning process is objectively a convincing
one. Consequently the Australian position on this matter is very close to the
US position and s 180(2) has some protective work to do in cases where in its
absence, there would or would arguably be a contravention of s 180(1).
The director or officer’s belief about the best interests of the corporation is to be
formed, and its rationality assessed, on the basis of the information obtained through
84 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7283].
85 Ibid, at [7284]. For application, see Mariner (2015) 241 FCR 502; 106 ACSR 343; [2015]
FCA 589; BC201505423 at [490]–[492].
86 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 181(1)(a).
87 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7288]. For application,
see Mariner (2015) 241 FCR 502; 106 ACSR 343; [2015] FCA 589; BC201505423 at
[493]–[495]. For a contrary view see Bainbridge and Connor, above n 34.
332 (2016) 31 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 55 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Thu Mar 9 13:41:55 2017
/journals/journal/ajcl/vol31pt3/part_3
compliance with subpara (c). It is not to be assumed, for the purpose of applying
subpara (d), that the director or officer knew everything that he or she ought to have
known, but only the things that he or she reasonably believed to be appropriate to
find out.88
The decision in the Rich case provides helpful guidance as to the operation of
the statutory business judgment rule and is likely to influence future cases that
seek to use s 180(2) given the eminence of its author and the detail of his
reasons.89 Importantly for present purposes, the Rich case clearly sees the
statutory business judgment rule as more than a sleepy hollow or ‘window
dressing’.90 Subject to a future appellate court ruling, it can be viewed as a
safe harbor that operates as a defence even where the defendant’s conduct has
been held to be unreasonable.
The operation of the business judgment rule was most recently considered
in detail in the Mariner case, which expresses the potential promise and
practical utility of the rule.
C The Mariner case
ASIC alleged that the directors of Mariner Corporation Ltd were reckless and
acted in breach of their duty of care and diligence under s 180(1) when they
made a takeover bid on behalf of the company without securing funding. The
proposed takeover involved far more money than what the company had, but
the company was engaged in negotiations to obtain further funding and had a
plan in place to sell a part of the target company’s business to generate further
funding. The company also announced the proposed takeover at a price below
what it had already paid for the target company’s shares in the prior 4 months
in breach of the ‘minimum price rule’ in s 621(3). ASIC also argued that the
company had breached rules relating to announcing takeover bids in s 631 and
had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct under s 1041H in announcing
a bid that it should have known it could not pay for. The court rejected ASIC’s
claims.
ASIC also argued that s 180(1) was contravened by the directors conduct in
relation to the takeover announcement even if there was no breach of the
takeover rules or misleading conduct. A central issue was the extent to which
a director should be taken to have contravened s 180(1) by reason of being
involved in a contravention by the company of another provision of the Act.
In this case, it was not enough that the conduct of the directors might have
caused the company to engage in conduct that could have broken the law,91
provided that the directors properly balanced the interests of the company and
the potential risks of the transaction.
With regard to the breach of s 180(1) claim, Justice Beach of the Federal
Court held that this provision does not ‘impose a wide-ranging obligation on
directors to ensure that the affairs of a company are conducted in accordance
88 Rich, ibid, at [7290]–[7291]. See further M Hooper, ‘The Business Judgment Rule: ASIC v
Rich and the Reasonable-Rational Divide’ (2010) 28 CSLJ 423; Legg and Jordan, above n
28.
89 See further A Lumsden, ‘The Business Judgment Defence: Insights from ASIC v Rich’
(2010) 28 CSLJ 164.
90 Young, above n 9.
91 Mariner (2015) 241 FCR 502; 106 ACSR 343; [2015] FCA 589; BC201505423 at [455].
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with law’.92 His Honour stated (at [447]) that ‘[i]t is wrong to assert that if a
director causes a company to contravene a provision of the Act, then
necessarily the director has contravened s 180’.
His Honour took into account the directors’ extensive backgrounds in
corporate law, commercial finance and mergers and acquisitions as well as
their expertise and knowledge at the relevant time of the bid which showed
potential for Mariner to make a significant profit. His Honour held that a
retrospective analysis should not be undertaken:
in looking at the transaction in question, it is important to adopt an ex ante
perspective where one is not just looking at potential risks and downsides but also
the potential benefits. That was the directors’ framework at the relevant time. And
that is necessarily the framework within which s 180 must be analysed. A
retrospective analysis of a transaction which did not proceed has the tendency to
overlook that latter dimension.93
The case by ASIC was dismissed on the basis that the benefits to Mariner of
pursuing the proposed takeover bid were significant and outweighed the risks.
In adopting this balancing approach between the foreseeable risk of harm and
potential benefit to the company, His Honour observed:
one expects management including the directors to take calculated risks. The very
nature of commercial activity necessarily involves uncertainty and risk taking. The
pursuit of an activity that might entail a foreseeable risk of harm does not of itself
establish a contravention of s 180. Moreover, a failed activity pursued by the
directors which causes loss to the company does not of itself establish a
contravention of s 180.94
His Honour held that the directors had properly balanced the potential risks
and rewards for the company in engaging in the transaction:
I accept that the alleged risks identified by ASIC were a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of a failure to take reasonable care and exercise diligence in connection
with the Austock takeover resolution. That is to say that these were potential
theoretical risks; I, of course, cannot say that they were likely or probable to occur.
But any risk of harm from these matters did not give rise to the risk of significant
jeopardy to Mariner’s interests. Moreover, the countervailing benefits well
outweighed any such risk.95
His Honour held that none of the directors had breached s 180(1) and, even if
they had, the elements of the statutory business judgment rule would have
been satisfied. The decision to initiate a takeover bid was a ‘business
judgment’ under s 180(3) and, importantly, the directors satisfied all the
elements of the statutory business judgment rule in that they had no personal
interest in the decision, acted to benefit the company (which stood to make a
large profit on the transaction) and were informed regarding the subject matter
of the decision. The proper level of information was based on the extensive
discussions that the directors had with potential funding parties prior to the
announcement of the takeover. His Honour held:
92 Ibid, at [444] (citing Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373; [2006] NSWSC 1052; BC200608176).
93 Mariner, ibid, at [13].
94 Ibid, at [452].
95 Ibid, at [461].
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Mr Olney-Fraser [the CEO] held the requisite belief. It was not a belief that no
reasonable person in Mr Olney-Fraser’s position would have held. Accordingly, the
belief was a rational one. Alternatively, as a matter of substance and in any event,
Mr Olney-Fraser’s process of reasoning was rational.96
The other directors were informed of the discussions by the CEO and
discussed this information and how firm the funding support was likely to be.
These actions complied with s 180(2)(c). The other directors were found to
have acted properly and in the absence of any material interest and in the
rational belief that the decision was in the interests of the company. These
actions supported a finding of compliance with s 180(2) if the directors had
been found to have contravened s 180(1) (which they had not for reasons
including obtaining the benefit of the reasonable reliance defence in s 189).
These conclusions were reached through reliance on, and application of, the
judicial analysis of s 180(2) by Austin J in Rich (see above).
The analysis in Rich and the decision in Mariner gives the statutory
business judgment rule a relatively broad scope for operation in situations
where the conduct would otherwise give rise to a contravention of the duty of
care. This will give some assistance to directors in making business decisions
because they will know that if their conduct fits within the scope of s 180(2)
then it cannot be successfully challenged under the duty of care. Furthermore,
the defendant’s only have to establish the elements of s 180(2) once a breach
of duty has been established. Even cases where the rule has not applied are
helpful for directors and officers to understand what standards of conduct are
expected and what practices will and will not satisfy the statutory rule.
However, the potential utility of the statutory business judgment rule seen
in Rich, and subsequently in Mariner, has not dramatically reduced the levels
of concern in the boardrooms of Australian companies about potential
liability. This is because the duty of care is only one element in the complex
web of liability provisions that may be imposed on company directors and
officers.97 Many of these laws impose criminal liability, sometimes by default
and in some cases with a reverse onus of proof. The statutory business
judgment provides no assistance in such cases, but neither was it intended to.98
It was introduced because of the particular danger of hindsight bias involved
in assessing ex post whether conduct was reasonable. The explanation of the
statutory business judgment rule in the Rich case gives the rule a role that goes
beyond the elements of the underlying duty in s 180(1). As one leading
corporate law practitioner notes:
96 Ibid, at [494].
97 For example, recent observations suggest that the voluntary uptake on the practice of
integrated reporting in Australia is being hampered by directors’ concerns about personal
liability exposure, particularly for forward-looking statements that subsequently prove to be
unfounded. See further, A Huggins, R Simnett and A Hargovan, ‘Integrated Reporting and
Directors’ Concerns about Personal Liability Exposure: Law Reform Options’ (2015) 33
CSLJ 176; J Du Plessis, and A Ruhmkorf, ‘New Trends Regarding Sustainability and
Integrated Reporting for Companies: What Protections do Directors have? (2015) 36
Comp L 51.
98 Redmond, above n 5, p 202.
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The existence of an effective business judgment defence may only be cold comfort,
but a defence that is well understood and whose very existence bears on their duty
goes some way towards predictability and certainty in a manager’s decision-making
process and its legal consequences.99
Furthermore, it could be argued that the clarity brought about by the Rich case
may have a deterrent effect on potential litigation against directors and
officers, at least in cases where there are reasonable prospects for the defence
to be applied. This could explain why there are so few cases on the issue
(either applying or not applying the rule). However, it is difficult (if not
impossible) to generalise as to why litigation is either brought or not brought.
Notwithstanding such developments and potential prospects arising from
the analysis in Rich, however, there has been public disquiet on the scope and
operation of the statutory rule. In light of the paucity of judicial authorities, the
limited scope of the statutory business judgment rule and the critical remarks
on its operation by Austin J in Rich,100 there has recently been a concerted
push for law reform.
IV Law reform proposals
A Overview
With the demise of CAMAC, and the seeming glacial pace of COAG reform,
the private sector has seized the law reform agenda from the government and
has proposed reforms to director liability. The AICD, in late 2014, proposed
the ‘honest and reasonable director defence’.101 Prior to this initiative in early
2013, the former leading corporate law judge, Dr Robert Austin and Minter
Ellison, proposed a new statutory business rule. This section critically
examines both proposals and concludes with an assessment of the future role
the statutory business judgment rule may play in corporate governance.102
B The AICD proposal
The AICD recently proposed a new broad based ‘honest and reasonable
director’ defence that would be included into Ch 9 of the Corporations Act
2001 (Cth). Chapter 9 contains provisions dealing with enforcement, remedies
and court powers. The proposed defence is as follows:
Honest and reasonable director defence
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the ASIC Act, if a director acts
(or does not act) and does so honestly, for a proper purpose and with the degree of
care and diligence that the director rationally believes to be reasonable in all the
circumstances, then the director will not be liable under or in connection with any
provision (including any strict liability offence) of the Corporations Act or the ASIC
99 Lumsden, above n 89, at 179.
100 (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410 at [7262]–[7269].
101 Available at <www.companydirectors.com.au> (accessed 17 February 2017).
102 The following discussion and analysis of the law reform proposals builds on J Harris and
A Hargovan, ‘Revisiting the Business Judgment Rule’ (2014) 66 Governance Directions
634.
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Act (or any equivalent grounds of liability in common law or in equity) applying to
the director in his or her capacity as a director.
The elements of this proposed defence are thus:
(a) A director has acted or refrained from acting;
(b) The conduct was honest;
(c) The conduct was for a proper purpose;
(d) The conduct was undertaken (or not undertaken) with the degree of
car and diligence that the director rationally believed to be reasonable
in all the circumstances
Where these elements are satisfied, the director will not be liable under or in
connection with any provision of the:
• Corporations Act
• ASIC Act
• Any equivalent grounds under common law or equity
insofar as the liability applies to the person’s capacity as a director.
It is significant to note that the proposed defence contains a mix of
subjective and objective assessments. The requirement to act honestly is a
subjective assessment (which is consistent with the current s 181(1)(a)). The
requirement to act properly has traditionally been assessed objectively under
s 181(1)(b).
The standard required to act with the degree of care and diligence under this
proposal is, in our view, more problematic. The current s 180(1) requires a
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same
circumstances, which is an objective assessment. This has been interpreted by
the courts as meaning that directors have minimum standards of conduct,
which are not changed by the actual knowledge or competency of the
individual director.103 For example, a non-executive director cannot argue that
they were not negligent for failing to read financial statements on the basis that
they were not trained as an accountant. All directors must be financially
literate and be able to monitor the financial performance of the company.
The proposed defence would mean that directors would only need to
perform at a standard of care and diligence that they rationally believed to be
reasonable. This turns the current s 180(1) on its head and renders it a
subjective assessment. This would take the law back to the time of Re City
Equitable Fire Insurance Company Ltd,104 where directors (particularly
non-executive directors) were recognised as owing only intermittent
obligations to the company. The AWA litigation in the early 1990s and the
insolvent trading cases in the late 80s/early 90s fundamentally reset the
assessment of director conduct in Australia.105 This proposed defence would
103 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607; BC9504558.
104 [1925] Ch 407; [1924] All ER Rep 485.
105 For discussion on developments in the law of duty of care, see A Hargovan, ‘Corporate
Law’s New Love: s 232(2) and the Director’s Duty of Care’ (1994) 3 Asia Pacific Law
Review 20; S Sievers, ‘Directors’ Duty of Care: What is the New Standard?’ (1997) 15 CSLJ
392.
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be a radical departure from existing law in Daniels v Anderson106 and, in the
opinion of the authors, a retrograde step for corporate governance for the
following reasons.
First, unlike the current statutory business judgment rule, the defence
proposed by the AICD is not limited to business judgments. Therefore, a
decision not to participate at all in the oversight of management of the
company (which has been held not to be a business judgment and therefore not
amenable to the statutory business judgment rule)107 could be protected as
long as the director was honest and the director rationally believed that the
conduct was reasonable in the circumstances. It could be argued that such a
decision would not be carried out for a proper purpose.
Second, the defence proposed seeks to override all existing obligations that
give rise to liabilities, even if these existing provisions already have defences.
For example, directors may be liable for defective disclosure in relation to
prospectus offerings or in respect of continuous disclosure obligations, but
both of these liabilities come with due diligence defences.108 It is questionable
whether the new defence is needed where there is already a due diligence
defence. It could be argued that certain conduct in relation to disclosure was
not undertaken for a proper purpose (see for example the conduct of the James
Hardie board in relation to the disclosure of the sufficiency of the asbestos
compensation fund), but then the question must be asked as to what utility the
defence will provide if compliance with existing legal obligations (such as
appropriate disclosure obligations) will be needed to demonstrate a proper
purpose. There is also authority to suggest that acting so as to cause the
company to breach its obligations under the law is not sufficient on its own to
demonstrate an improper purpose.109
C The new statutory BJR proposal
The proposal for a new statutory business judgment rule by Dr Robert Austin,
discussed below, provides for a broad based defence that is intended to operate
well beyond traditional corporate law statutes.110
Dr Austin’s proposal addresses long-standing concerns about derivative
liability where company directors are often made liable for the corporation’s
conduct by default. The proposed defence would be inserted into the
interpretation statutes that operate federally and in each state and territory and
therefore would be applicable to all statutes, not just the Corporations Act and
the ASIC Act. The proposed defence is as follows:
Section XXX Protection for Directors of a Corporation where a Business Judgment
is Made
106 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16 ACSR 607; BC9504558. For a collection and discussion of
modern judicial authorities on the statutory and general law duties of care, see Austin, Ford
and Ramsay, above n 19, at [8.305].
107 Gold Ribbon [2006] QCA 335; Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229;
BC200910410 at [7277]–[7278].
108 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 728, 729 and 731 (prospectus liability); s 674(2A) and
(2B) (continuous disclosure).
109 Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR 373; [2006] NSWSC 1052; BC200608176.
110 See Austin, above n 11. The authors gratefully acknowledge the permission of Dr Austin to
extract this draft provision for academic critique.
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(1) In this section, an exposure to liability includes exposure to:
(a) criminal or civil liability under any Act or the general law;
(b) a penalty of any kind; and
(c) contravention of a provision of an Act.
(2) This section applies where:
(a) a section of an Act (the Affected Section):
(i) imposes a duty on a director of a corporation, or on a class (such as
officers of the corporation) which includes a director of a corporation;
or
(ii) exposes a director of a corporation, or a class which includes a
director of a corporation, to liability (whether the exposure to liability
arises only out of that section or out of that section together with some
other provision or provisions to which that section is related); and
(b) a question arises as to the application of the Affected Section to an
alleged act, conduct or omission by a director of a corporation,
whether occurring in this jurisdiction or elsewhere.
(3) A director of a corporation, when acting in the capacity of director of that
corporation, does not breach a duty imposed by an Affected Section, and is
not exposed to liability by an Affected Section, unless it is proved by the
party alleging the breach of duty or exposure to liability that:
(a) the act, conduct or omission that is alleged to constitute the breach of
duty or exposure to liability was not, and did not arise out of, a
business judgment made by the director in the capacity of director; or
(b) in respect of any act, conduct or omission that is, or arises out of, a
business judgment made by the director in the capacity of director:
(i) the director was dishonest; or
(ii) the director had a material personal interest in the subject matter of the
business judgment which has not been disclosed to the board; or
(iii) the business judgment made by the director was one that no
reasonable person in that director’s position could have made.
(4) In this section:
(a) business judgment means an exercise of judgment relating to taking or
not taking action in connection with any business of the corporation;
(b) words and phrases used in this section that are given general definition
in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) have the meaning given to them
by that Act; and
(c) Act includes a regulation or instrument made under an Act.
This proposal moves beyond a mere defence by setting up a presumption of
no liability for business judgments. This is similar to the way the business
judgment rule operates in some parts of the United States, particularly in the
leading corporate law State of Delaware (where the majority of Fortune 500
companies are registered). In that state the business judgment rule involves a
judicial presumption that ‘in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company’.111 As the
Delaware Supreme Court said the ‘board of directors enjoys presumption of
sound business judgment; its decisions will not be disturbed by court if they
can be attributed to any rational business purpose; and court will not substitute
111 Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A 2d 805 at 812.
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its own notions of sound business judgment’.112 The presumption must be
overcome by plaintiffs alleging breach of directors’ duties, although it does not
apply to decisions that are tainted by bad faith, self-interest or gross
negligence.113
The proposed reform by Dr Austin is consistent with what the courts have
been saying for more than a century — that it is not the role of the courts to
pass judgment on honest business decisions.114 Indeed, the Rich case in
2009,115 the then Austin J (who has since retired from the bench) held that
directors and officers are not liable under the duty of care for mere mistakes.116
The courts have consistently held that it is up to the directors to determine
what is in the interests of the company, not the courts. If a business decision
turns out to be the wrong decision and the company suffers loss, then unless
the decision is affected by a negligent decision making process (to trigger the
duty of care under s 180(1)), or the decision was tainted by bad faith or
impropriety (see ss 181–183) then it is not reviewable by the courts. The
proposed reform would enshrine the common law business judgment rule into
statutes across the country.
The elements of (3)(b) are consistent with the current s 181(1)(a) (the
requirement to act in good faith) and s 191 (disclosure of material personal
interests). The elements of (3)(b)(ii) are less stringent than the current
statutory business judgment rule (s 180(2)(b)) which does not allow for any
material personal interests, including those disclosed to the board. The
elements of (3)(b)(iii) overlap with the current statutory business judgment
rule in s 180(2), although the element of being reasonably informed
(s 180(2)(c)) is absent. The proposed standard of reasonableness is tougher
than the current s180(2)(d) which requires a rational belief that the judgment
was in the best interests of the corporations.
The AICD proposal, in our view, fundamentally alters the current
enforcement and accountability framework underpinning the CorporationsAct
and the ASIC Act. It significantly dilutes the standard of conduct currently
expected of directors in Australia.117 In the context of corporate law, as noted
by the Treasury Paper (2007),118 the standard of conduct states how directors
should conduct a given activity or make a decision. It is highly questionable
whether the proposed lowering of standards by the AICD proposal would be
in line with current community expectations and meet contemporary standards
of corporate governance.
112 Sinclair Oil Corporation v Levien (1971) 280 A 2d 717.
113 See Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A 2d 805; Smith v Van Gorkom (1985) 488 A 2d 858.
114 See, eg, Re Suburban Hotel Company (1867) LR 2 Ch App 737; Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd
[1942] Ch 304; Harlowe’s Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) Oil Co NL (1968)
121 CLR 483; BC6800800.
115 Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC 1229; BC200910410.
116 See further, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lindberg (2012) 91 ACSR
640; [2012] VSC 332; BC201205854 at [72].
117 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180(1)); Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; 16
ACSR 607; BC9504558. The statutory duty of care and diligence imposes a standard
essentially the same as that under common law: Rich (2009) 75 ACSR 1; [2009] NSWSC
1229; BC200910410.
118 Treasury, Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law, above n 1, at [2.2].
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IV Conclusion: The future of the statutory business
judgment rule
During the period from 2000–2009, as discussed earlier under Part III, there
were numerous major corporate law cases concerning the duty of care,
including major litigation brought by ASIC in the much-publicised cases
involving GIO,119 James Hardie,120 Fortescue Metals Group (FMG)121 and
Centro.122 These cases demonstrate that decisions by directors and officers
about internal and external information flows are being increasingly subject to
regulatory action by ASIC based on breaches of the duty of care. In none of
these cases has the statutory business judgment rule protected directors, but
this is not necessarily indicative of a flaw in the rule itself.123
The judicial analysis in Rich demonstrates that the statutory business
judgment rule is more than simply an echo of the underlying duty. It can serve
a function that recognises that there is a social utility in not rendering all
instances of negligence capable of civil enforcement. This is reminiscent of
the distinction made by Professor Melvin Eisenberg in an often-cited
article,124 which is that the law appropriately sets two standards with respect
to the duty of care. One standard is the standard of director conduct expected
by the community which in Australia is reflected in the terms of s 180(1). The
other standard is the standard of review that the courts will use to assess the
actual conduct undertaken by corporate boards. This standard is more flexible
because the law needs to encourage entrepreneurial risk taking. The statutory
119 Vines v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2007) 73 NSWLR 451; 62
ACSR 1; [2007] NSWCA 75; BC200702341.
120 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Macdonald (No 11) (2009) 256 ALR
199; 71 ACSR 368; [2009] NSWSC 287; BC200903649 (appeal allowed in part: Morley v
ASIC (2010) 274 ALR 205; 81 ACSR 285; [2010] NSWCA 331; BC201009833); ASIC v
Hellicar (2012) 247 CLR 345; 88 ACSR 246; [2012] HCA 17; BC201202609;Shafron v
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 465; 88 ACSR 126;
[2012] HCA 18; BC201202608.
121 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (2011) 1
190 FCR 364; 81 ACSR 563; [2011] FCAFC 19; BC201100543. Decision overturned in
Forrest v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2012) 247 CLR 486; 91 ACSR
128; [2012] HCA 39; BC201207489.
122 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; 83 ACSR
484; [2011] FCA 717; BC201104526. Centro may perhaps be put to one side as it involved
directors who failed to properly monitor the company’s financial operations by failing to
detect that the company was reporting no short-term liabilities despite having themselves
approved major short term loans shortly before. The directors said that they felt
overwhelmed with information but they were found to have breached their duty of care by
failing to properly read the documents that they were given and that they signed as having
agreed with. See further P Crutchfield and C Button, ‘Men over board: The burden of
directors’ duties in the wake of the Centro case’ (2012) 30 CSLJ 83.
123 As noted earlier in Part III, the rule was inapplicable in GIO due to the timing of the facts
and could not have applied in Centro as that case concerned the duty to monitor. The
non-application of the rule in the James Hardie case was a function of the evidence and the
way the defences were run. This is similar to the FMG case, but that case is more significant
as it suggests the rule is inapplicable to decisions regarding compliance.
124 M Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law’ (1993) 62 Ford LR 437. See also J Cassidy, ‘Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review: Divergence of the Duty of Care in the United States and Australia’
(2000) 28 ABLR 180.
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business judgment rule embodies this second standard identified by Eisenberg,
just as the business judgment rule does in the United States.
Opponents of the statutory business judgment rule at the time of its
introduction argued that the rule would offer little actual protection for
directors and officers. The stated need for certainty would be unrealised
because the rule offered little more than the terms of the duty itself. The
statutory business judgment rule, as noted earlier, has been criticised as
offering nothing but mere window dressing.125 The first 9 years of the
operation of the statutory rule provides support for the view that the rule had
become the sleepy hollow predicted because it had only been established once
during that time. However, the absence of case law does not necessarily mean
that the statutory rule is a complete failure. It is possible that the absence of
case law indicates that the statutory rule is operating as intended by
discouraging actions that would have sought to use the duty of care to review
bona fide business decisions made by directors and officers. It may also be that
the prospect of the defence operating discouraged such actions.
Notwithstanding the status quo, the statutory business judgment rule,
however, would not appear to be moribund. In assessing the future role of the
statutory business judgment rule, the critical issues raised in the Treasury
papers above (2007; 2010), in the Rich judgment (2009) and Mariner (2015),
and the law reform proposal put forward by Dr Austin (2013), offers
encouragement for the rule to play a more meaningful role to protect against
director liabilities for breach of duties. In particular, if Dr Austin’s law reform
model is adopted, the reversal of the current onus of proof and the emphasis
on the operation of the statutory business judgment rule as a presumption will
ensure that the rule has an even greater potential to become more than simply
a sleepy hollow in the future.
In any future recalibration of the statutory business judgment rule, it is
important to strike the right balance between director authority and
accountability. On this critical issue of balance,126 the Treasury paper (2007)
recognised the risks in failing to getting the balance right. Its observations
bear repeating:
If corporate law is engendering an overly conservative approach to business decision
making, this could discourage decisions that would advance the interests of the
company. Risk-averse behaviour can increase agency costs and diminish return to
shareholders. It may also reduce efficiency, productivity and economic growth.127
In getting the balance right, the current formulation of the statutory business
judgment rule has proven to be a difficult transplant from the United States, as
evidenced in the Rich judgment.
In light thereof, and the competing law reform models presented by the
private sector with its differing emphasis on director accountability,
parliament is urged to consider a reassessment of the operation of the statutory
business judgment rule. The Austin law reform model, in our view, offers a
better template for the resurrection of the statutory business judgment rule. It
promotes superior director accountability while striking an appropriate
125 Young, above n 9, at 222.
126 See further, Legg and Jordan, above n 28.
127 Treasury, Review of Sanctions in Corporate Law, above n 1, at [1.4].
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balance between promoting good behaviour and ensuring directors are willing
to take sensible commercial risks.
However, in our view the case for fundamental reform is yet to be
comprehensively made. With the recent demise of CAMAC, we recommend
pursuing an ALRC reference, or failing that a Productivity Commission
reference, to examine the claims that the current system of director liability is
producing poor economic outcomes. While the AICD and others continue to
point to surveys of directors about their views on liability, these views are only
one part of the debate. The current dilemma is that there appears to be only
one loud voice in this debate. We need a mature and well-rounded
examination of the current liability framework to ensure that our corporate
laws appropriately balance liability and accountability with promoting
entrepreneurial risk taking.
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